America’s Withdrawal Doctrine: The Emerging Foreign Policy Paradigm Under Trump’s Second Term

March 26, 2025 — by Gloria Major

Beyond the Spectacle Analysis

America’s withdrawal doctrine is rapidly transforming the global security order, reversing nearly eight decades of bipartisan foreign policy consensus. President Trump’s second administration has moved beyond campaign rhetoric to implement fundamental changes in America’s relationship with allies, potentially creating the most significant realignment of global power since the end of World War II.

This analysis examines the strategic contours of this emerging paradigm and its implications for both European security and global stability.

From Truman to Trump: the reversal of American security doctrine

The current transformation represents a direct repudiation of what has been called the “Truman Doctrine” – the 1947 commitment that shaped American foreign policy for over 75 years. President Truman’s declaration that “it must be a policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure” [1] established America’s self-defined role as leader of the free world.

This doctrine, which guided both Republican and Democratic administrations through the Cold War and beyond, is now being explicitly dismantled. The President’s recent statement that “If [NATO countries] don’t pay, I’m not going to defend them. No, I’m not going to defend them” [2] represents not just a negotiating position but a fundamental reconsideration of America’s global role.

What distinguishes Trump’s position from his predecessors is not the demand for increased European defense spending, a consistent theme across multiple administrations, but rather the explicit questioning of Article 5, NATO’s mutual defense provision. Former UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace’s assessment that “Article 5 is on life support” [3] reflects growing concerns that the cornerstone of European security can no longer be taken for granted.

The domestic drivers of foreign policy transformation

While often analyzed purely in terms of international relations, America’s withdrawal doctrine has deep domestic roots. The current administration’s foreign policy appears significantly influenced by three interrelated domestic factors.

Cultural and political polarization

Unlike previous foreign policy shifts, today’s transformation is uniquely entangled with America’s internal cultural divisions. The administration’s apparent affinity for leaders like Russia’s Vladimir Putin reflects what some analysts have described as an alignment around “conservative values” in opposition to Western progressivism [4].

This represents a departure from traditional American foreign policy, where bipartisan consensus typically maintained continuity regardless of domestic political shifts. Today, as RUSI senior research fellow Ed Arnold notes, “The US is becoming divorced from European values,” creating a division that is “structural, cultural and potentially long-term” [5].

Economic nationalism and burden-sharing

The administration’s critique of international commitments predates its political ascendance. As early as 1987, Trump questioned America’s defense commitments, asking: “Why are these nations not paying the United States for the human lives and billions of dollars we are losing to protect their interests?” [6]

This long-standing skepticism has evolved into a formal policy position that views America’s security guarantees through a transactional lens, with military protection contingent on financial contributions rather than shared strategic interests or values.

The personalization of international relations

The administration has shifted from institutional to personal diplomacy, with relationships between leaders taking precedence over formal alliances. This approach, evident in the leaked messages regarding Yemen operations where Vice President Vance reportedly expressed “loathing of European free-loading” [7], suggests foreign policy increasingly reflects personal affinities rather than institutional commitments.

The global implications: power vacuums and opportunistic actors

America’s withdrawal doctrine creates space for both allies and adversaries to recalculate their strategic positions. Several key developments warrant close attention.

European security recalibration

European leaders appear increasingly convinced that American security guarantees are unreliable. Polling indicates a remarkable shift in public sentiment, with nearly three-quarters of French citizens now believing the United States is not an ally, while majorities in traditionally pro-American Britain and Denmark hold unfavorable views [8].

This perception has accelerated calls for European security autonomy, with German Chancellor-designate Friedrich Merz declaring that “Europe must make itself independent of the United States” [9]. The challenge, as Armida van Rij of Chatham House notes, lies in “the divisions within Europe on how to actually do this and whether to actually do this” [10].

Russia’s strategic opportunity

For Moscow, America’s withdrawal doctrine represents a significant strategic opening. President Putin’s assessment that “the entire system of Euro-Atlantic security is crumbling before our eyes” [11] reflects Russian recognition of a potentially transformative moment in European security architecture.

The Kremlin’s declaration after President Zelensky’s White House meeting that “the fragmentation of the West has begun” [12] signals confidence that long-standing Russian objectives may be within reach. As van Rij observes, Russia’s goals “are to destabilize Europe, weaken NATO, and get the Americans to withdraw their troops from here,” objectives that now appear increasingly attainable [13].

A return to spheres of influence

The emerging paradigm suggests a potential return to a “spheres of influence” model of international relations, where major powers exert control over their regional peripheries with limited external interference. This approach, which characterized much of 19th and early 20th century international politics, represents a significant departure from the post-Cold War emphasis on sovereignty and self-determination for smaller nations.

Military readiness and the reality gap

The administration’s call for European security autonomy confronts significant practical obstacles, particularly regarding military capabilities. European defense spending has declined approximately 70% since the Cold War peak [14], creating substantial gaps in both hardware and operational capabilities.

Beyond budgetary constraints, recruitment challenges present a structural limitation that money alone cannot quickly solve. As Wallace notes, “The West is in freefall in its military recruiting, it’s not just Britain,” creating a fundamental constraint on force projection capabilities [15].

The most critical gaps involve what historian Timothy Garton Ash calls the “strategic enablers”, satellites, intelligence capabilities, and advanced missile defense systems like Patriot batteries that can counter ballistic missile threats [16]. Developing European alternatives to these exclusively American capabilities would require not just increased spending but industrial policy coordination across the continent.

Our view: the strategic outlook and probabilities

America’s withdrawal doctrine creates a period of extraordinary uncertainty in global security arrangements. Based on current trajectories, several developments appear increasingly probable.

A European-centered NATO

First, NATO’s transformation from an American-led alliance to a more European-centered security architecture is likely to accelerate. This shift, however, will require confronting significant internal European divisions about burden-sharing, command structures, and strategic priorities. The greatest challenge will be developing what Garton Ash describes as a “Europeanized” NATO capable of “defending Europe even if an American president says ‘leave us out of this’” [17].

Russia’s continued aggression

Second, Russia will continue probing for weaknesses in the European security architecture, particularly in regions where NATO commitments might be tested. While a direct military confrontation with established NATO members remains unlikely, hybrid operations designed to exploit uncertainty about American guarantees will likely intensify. The effectiveness of such operations will largely depend on the credibility of European deterrence capabilities.

Defense consolidation in Europe

Third, we anticipate accelerated defense industrial consolidation across Europe, though with significant obstacles. The challenge, as van Rij notes, lies in overcoming “vested national interests” that have historically hindered integration efforts [18]. However, the perceived urgency of the current moment may prove sufficient to overcome traditional barriers to cooperation.

Security recalibration across the globe

Fourth, America’s withdrawal doctrine will have ripple effects beyond Europe, potentially triggering security recalibrations in Asia and the Middle East as allies reassess American reliability. This could accelerate regional arms races and security competitions as states seek to reduce dependence on uncertain American guarantees.

Deteriorating rules-based international order

Most consequentially, we believe the strategic competition between democratic and authoritarian governance models will intensify. The administration’s apparent comfort with what Robert Kagan has called “a world in which the major powers, unconstrained by internationally agreed laws, are free to impose their will on smaller, weaker nations” [19] represents a fundamental challenge to the rules-based international order established after World War II.

A new paradigm of power politics

For institutional and market stakeholders navigating this transformation, strategic positioning will require extraordinary adaptability. The assumptions that have guided business planning, investment decisions, and institutional arrangements for more than three generations are now subject to fundamental reconsideration.

Successfully navigating this environment will require recognizing that the post-war international order, long taken for granted, appears to be giving way to an uncertain new paradigm defined more by power politics than institutional constraints.

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