A dialogue between Morgan Treadwell and Gloria Major
Introduction: Democracy in the Global Context
Morgan Treadwell: Our analyses at Beyond the Spectacle typically focus on internal dynamics of American governance—examining how leadership decisions affect domestic institutions. But there’s another dimension we haven’t fully explored: how these patterns appear to the wider world. International perceptions of American democracy have significant implications for our global standing, diplomatic leverage, and national security. Gloria, with your expertise in how technological and governance systems interact globally, what patterns are you seeing in international responses to recent developments?
Gloria Major: You’re right to point us outward, Morgan. My Machine Civilisation Framework helps us understand that democratic governance exists within a broader ecosystem of technological, economic, and social forces that transcend national boundaries. What’s particularly striking in current data is the divergence between America’s self-perception and how our governance is viewed internationally. Major democracy indices from nonpartisan institutions show a consistent pattern of concern about American democratic stability that many Americans either don’t recognize or dismiss as foreign bias.
Morgan Treadwell: Let’s examine those indices as our starting point—they provide objective metrics that transcend partisan framing. What specific trends do they reveal?
Measuring Democratic Reputation: What the Data Shows
Gloria Major: Three major democracy indices provide particularly valuable insights because they use consistent methodologies across countries and time periods. The V-Dem Institute’s Liberal Democracy Index [1], produced by the University of Gothenburg, shows America experiencing what they term “significant democratic erosion” since 2016. While there was a slight recovery after 2020, the United States still ranks lower than all other G7 democracies in their measurements.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index [2] has categorized the U.S. as a “flawed democracy” rather than a “full democracy” since 2016. Their 2023 report cited particular concerns about “polarization of political institutions” and “declining trust in the electoral process.”
Perhaps most concerning is Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report [3], which has documented an 11-point decline in America’s democracy score over the past decade—one of the most significant declines among established democracies. Their 2023 analysis noted “a breakdown in consensus about democratic norms” as a primary factor.
Morgan Treadwell: These measurements present a sobering picture, but I’m curious how different regions perceive these changes. Are there variations in how American democratic shifts are viewed across different parts of the world?
Gloria Major: Absolutely. The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes surveys [4] provide valuable insights here. Their data shows a marked divergence between how traditional allies and other nations perceive American democracy. Among traditional European allies, confidence that the U.S. “respects personal freedoms” fell from an average of 76% in 2013 to 57% in 2023—a significant decline, though still a majority view.
The pattern in Asian democracies is more complex. Japan and South Korea show similar concerns to European allies, while India and the Philippines maintain more positive views of American democracy—though primarily framed through their security relationships rather than democratic values.
The most dramatic shift appears in public opinion among emerging democracies in Africa and Latin America, where the U.S. has historically promoted democratic institutions. In these regions, belief that America provides a good democratic model fell from 74% in 2013 to just 47% in 2023 according to Pew data.
Morgan Treadwell: Those perceptual shifts have real implications for American influence. When nations lose confidence in our democratic model, they’re less likely to follow our lead on global issues or adopt our preferred approaches to governance. What’s particularly interesting is how these perceptions are shaped by specific governance patterns rather than just general impressions.
The Musk-Government Dynamic: How Recent Events Shape Global Perceptions
Gloria Major: Recent developments provide a perfect case study. The unusual governance arrangement between Elon Musk and the Trump administration—particularly the creation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) with Musk as its unofficial head—has drawn significant international attention. Foreign observers, especially from established democracies, view this arrangement through the lens of institutional norms rather than policy outcomes.
This week’s reported tensions between Musk and cabinet officials, particularly Secretary of State Rubio, have been prominently covered in international media. The Financial Times described the cabinet meeting confrontation as “an American governance experiment being watched closely by democratic allies.” Die Welt in Germany characterized it as “unorthodox governance that challenges traditional democratic guardrails.”
Morgan Treadwell: What I find particularly interesting is how differently this arrangement is perceived in different political systems. Democratic allies seem concerned about institutional norms, while authoritarian regimes focus on different aspects entirely.
Gloria Major: Precisely. The reporting patterns reveal these divergent perspectives. Media in democratic allies—particularly Canada, Western Europe, Japan, and Australia—has focused primarily on governance process concerns: the concentration of power in unelected hands, the circumvention of traditional oversight mechanisms, and the potential undermining of civil service protections.
In contrast, Chinese state media has framed the Musk-Trump relationship through an economic lens, suggesting it represents “privatization of governance functions” and “corporate capture of regulatory authority.” This framing serves China’s narrative that Western democracy inherently leads to plutocracy.
Russian commentary has emphasized the personalization of power, with outlets like RT framing recent tensions as evidence that “American democracy increasingly relies on powerful individuals rather than institutions”—messaging that helps normalize Russia’s own personalized governance model.
Morgan Treadwell: This reminds me of the research by political scientist Joseph Nye on soft power—America’s ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce. Democratic governance has historically been one of our strongest soft power assets. When that asset weakens, our global influence relies more heavily on economic and military leverage alone.
International Institutions and Democratic Credibility
Gloria Major: The implications extend beyond bilateral relationships to our standing in international institutions. The Community of Democracies, which the United States helped found in 2000 to promote democratic governance globally, has seen interesting internal dynamics in response to American democratic shifts.
At their ministerial meeting in September 2023, participating nations adopted language about “recommitting to democratic fundamentals” and “addressing democratic backsliding within established democracies”—diplomatic phrasing widely understood to reference concerns about several members, including the United States.
Similarly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released a 2023 report on “Democratic Resilience” that specifically referenced governance challenges in founding democracies without naming specific countries. The report noted: “When established democracies experience governance challenges, it undermines democracy promotion efforts globally.”
Morgan Treadwell: These diplomatic signals matter because they affect our credibility in promoting democratic norms elsewhere. How can we credibly criticize democratic backsliding in other countries if we’re experiencing similar patterns ourselves?
This connects to another dimension worth exploring—how America’s internal democratic challenges are exploited by geopolitical competitors. What patterns are you seeing in how adversaries leverage these perceptions?
How Adversaries Exploit Democratic Vulnerabilities
Gloria Major: This is where my Machine Civilisation Framework provides particular insight. What we’re witnessing is the systematic exploitation of democratic vulnerability narratives through technological amplification. Both Russia and China have developed sophisticated approaches to leveraging perceptions of American democratic weakness, but with different strategic objectives.
Russia’s approach focuses on amplifying existing divisions to deepen polarization. The EU’s East StratCom Task Force [5], which tracks Russian disinformation, documented how Russian state media and affiliated online channels selectively amplify real governance controversies in the U.S. to promote a narrative of democratic dysfunction.
For example, Russian outlets gave extensive coverage to the recent cabinet confrontation between Musk and administration officials, but framed it as evidence that American democracy is inherently unstable and subordinate to business interests—a narrative that serves Russia’s goal of relativizing its own democratic shortcomings.
Morgan Treadwell: China’s approach seems more strategic and long-term oriented. Rather than simply exploiting divisions, they present their governance model as a coherent alternative.
Gloria Major: Exactly. China’s “democracy with Chinese characteristics” messaging explicitly positions their governance model as more stable and effective than Western liberal democracy. Their 2023 white paper on “Chinese Democracy” specifically contrasted their system with what they termed “chaos and dysfunction in Western systems.”
The Chinese government-affiliated Global Times cited the Trump-Musk dynamics as evidence that “American democracy increasingly serves billionaire interests rather than ordinary citizens,” a narrative that bolsters China’s claim that their system better serves public welfare despite lacking traditional democratic features.
This messaging has proven particularly effective in developing nations. Afrobarometer surveys [6] – show that the percentage of respondents in surveyed African nations who view China’s governance model positively increased from 26% in 2015 to 38% in 2023, while positive perceptions of American democracy declined during the same period.
Alliance Management in an Era of Democratic Uncertainty
Morgan Treadwell: These perception shifts create strategic challenges for American foreign policy. Traditional allies—particularly in Europe and East Asia—have historically aligned with the U.S. partly based on shared democratic values. How are they adapting to perceived democratic uncertainty in America?
Gloria Major: We’re seeing a clear pattern of hedging behavior among allies—maintaining their U.S. relationships while simultaneously preparing for potential disruptions. The European Union’s Strategic Autonomy initiative, which gained momentum after 2016, represents the most visible institutional response. While officially described as complementary to NATO, internal EU documents reveal it was partially motivated by what German Chancellor Scholz termed “democratic volatility” among key allies.
Japan and South Korea have pursued similar hedging strategies in Asia. While strengthening security ties with the U.S. to counter China, they’ve simultaneously expanded regional security frameworks that don’t depend entirely on American leadership. Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative and expanded defense relationships with Australia and India reflect this balanced approach.
Morgan Treadwell: These hedging strategies seem prudent from allies’ perspectives, but they create long-term challenges for American influence. When allies develop independent capabilities and relationships, our leverage inevitably diminishes. This suggests democratic reputation isn’t just a matter of values but a concrete national security asset that’s currently depreciating.
Economic Dimensions of Democratic Reputation
Gloria Major: The economic implications are equally significant. The World Bank’s Governance Indicators [7], which include measurements of democratic accountability and institutional quality, show a clear correlation between these factors and foreign direct investment. Countries with declining governance scores typically experience either investment reduction or demands for risk premiums on that investment.
While the U.S. hasn’t yet seen dramatic investment shifts due to governance concerns, subtle indicators have emerged. The “democracy risk premium” in certain investment categories has increased since 2016. Moody’s Analytics has documented how political polarization and institutional uncertainty have begun to affect investment decisions, particularly in sectors dependent on regulatory stability.
Morgan Treadwell: That connects to another economic dimension—the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency, which depends partly on confidence in American governance stability. While there’s no immediate threat to this status, long-term trends could be concerning if governance uncertainty persists.
Beyond Perception: The Reality of Democratic Resilience
Gloria Major: Despite these concerning patterns, we should acknowledge America’s democratic resilience factors. Our system contains significant decentralization that resists authoritarian consolidation. Federalism distributes power across national, state, and local levels, creating multiple centers of authority that have proven resistant to centralization.
Additionally, America maintains a robust civil society, independent media (despite economic challenges), strong universities, and an independent judiciary that continues to function as a check on power despite increased pressure. These institutional strengths don’t eliminate concerns about democratic backsliding but do suggest greater resilience than in countries that experienced more complete democratic collapse.
Morgan Treadwell: That’s an important point. Acknowledging democratic challenges doesn’t mean accepting a narrative of inevitable decline. However, resilience isn’t automatic—it requires conscious reinforcement of democratic norms and institutional independence.
The Path Forward: Rebuilding Democratic Credibility
Gloria Major: Historical precedent suggests democratic reputation can be rebuilt, though it requires deliberate effort. After Watergate, America undertook significant governance reforms that helped restore democratic credibility internationally. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Presidential Records Act, and Ethics in Government Act all emerged from that period of governance reform.
The most effective approach would combine institutional reforms with renewed commitment to democratic promotion internationally. The Biden administration attempted this with its Summit for Democracy initiative [8], though with limited concrete outcomes. More substantive would be strengthening democratic institutions at home while engaging constructively with international democracy monitoring mechanisms.
Morgan Treadwell: From a citizen perspective, democratic resilience ultimately depends on civic engagement that transcends partisan divides. When citizens prioritize institutional health over partisan advantage—supporting democratic norms even when they temporarily disadvantage their preferred party—democratic systems prove remarkably durable.
Democracy as a Global Ecosystem
Gloria Major: Viewing American democracy through a global lens reveals its interconnectedness with democratic governance worldwide. The Machine Civilisation Framework helps us understand that democracy exists within complex technological, economic, and social systems that cross national boundaries. When American democratic institutions weaken, it affects not just our governance but democratic resilience globally.
Morgan Treadwell: That perspective extends our focus beyond partisan disputes to recognize democracy as a shared inheritance that requires constant renewal. International perceptions offer a valuable mirror—sometimes reflecting uncomfortable truths about democratic challenges that partisan framing might obscure.
For citizens concerned about American global standing, democratic reputation represents perhaps our most valuable strategic asset. Protecting that asset requires looking beyond policy disagreements to the fundamental health of democratic institutions and norms. The path forward isn’t partisan victory but democratic renewal that rebuilds confidence both at home and abroad in America’s capacity for self-governance.
Morgan Treadwell and Gloria Major are co-founders of Beyond the Spectacle, an independent platform examining governance patterns and their implications for democratic institutions.
Footnotes
- V-Dem Institute’s Liberal Democracy Index, University of Gothenburg: https://www.v-dem.net/
- The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index: https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index/
- Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world
- Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes surveys: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/topics/democratic-values/
- EU East StratCom Task Force: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/
- Afrobarometer surveys: https://www.afrobarometer.org/
- World Bank’s Governance Indicators: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
- Summit for Democracy: https://www.state.gov/summit-for-democracy/