Two different Americas
Humans love stories. Our brains make sense of complex reality through narratives that explain who we are and where we’re going. For the past decade, Americans have been living through two entirely different stories about their country. People watching different news channels or scrolling through different social media feeds might as well be living in parallel universes.
This division isn’t just about policy disagreements. Those have always existed in democracies. What makes the past decade extraordinary is that Americans can’t even agree on basic facts. When citizens can’t agree on whether an election was legitimate, whether a pandemic requires collective action, or whether climate change is real, they can’t make the compromises democracy needs. The result is what experts call “pernicious polarization,” where political opponents become seen as dangerous enemies.[1]
Imagine an alien studying American politics from 2015 to 2025. It would see a society where about one-third of citizens believe the 2020 election was stolen despite no evidence, where wearing masks during a pandemic became a political statement rather than a health measure, and where routine government functions like raising the debt ceiling became bitter partisan battles.[2]
How we got here
This extreme division didn’t appear from nowhere. It came from several connected developments:
- social media algorithms that boost outrage to keep people engaged
- Americans moving to communities where everyone thinks alike
- economic changes that made people lose faith in institutions
- politicians who discovered that inflaming tribal identities was an easier path to power than solving problems[3]
The consequences go far beyond uncomfortable holiday dinners. Democracy depends on what political scientists call “forbearance” – unwritten rules that prevent officials from using their powers in ways that damage the system itself. For most of American history, presidents didn’t declare national emergencies to bypass Congress, congressional majorities didn’t block judicial appointments from minorities, and losing candidates didn’t routinely claim elections were rigged. The breakdown of these norms has weakened our democratic guardrails just when technology and economic changes were already putting pressure on the system.[4]
The economy: good numbers, bad feelings
The American economy of the past decade presents a strange contradiction. By standard measurements, it did remarkably well: unemployment reached historic lows, stock markets hit record highs, and even after a global pandemic and inflation spike, the economy showed impressive resilience. Yet at the same time, many Americans felt deeply anxious and disillusioned about the economy.
This contradiction comes from a fundamental change in how economic growth affects everyday life. For most of the 20th century, when the economy grew, almost everyone’s living standards improved. But over the past decade, Americans saw a striking split. The economy grew substantially, but that growth concentrated in ways that left many people wondering if the system still worked for them.[5]
By the numbers
The numbers tell part of this story. From 2010 to 2023, the S&P 500 stock index increased by about 267%, but median household wealth grew by just 37% after inflation. Even more dramatically, the share of wealth owned by the top 1% of Americans increased from 29% to 34%, while the bottom 50% remained below 3%.[6] This split was visible in the landscape: thriving coastal cities with gleaming towers and expensive coffee shops contrasted with declining regions full of closed factories and dollar stores.

But simple inequality statistics miss the deeper change. Americans experienced what economists call “profit without prosperity” – a system where corporate profits and stock returns disconnected from worker pay and community wellbeing. When the companies dominating the stock market succeeded by minimizing labor costs, automating jobs, and shifting profits to tax havens, the traditional link between economic success and middle-class prosperity fundamentally changed.[7]
This helps explain why economic dissatisfaction crossed party lines. During the 2016 presidential primaries, both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump – political opposites in many ways – attracted passionate support by questioning a system where trade deals, financial deregulation, and corporate mergers seemed to benefit elites while leaving many communities behind. Their campaigns offered different answers to the same question: What happened to an economy that was supposed to work for everyone?[8]
COVID’s impact
The COVID-19 pandemic both highlighted and accelerated these divisions. While office workers adapted to remote work from comfortable homes, essential workers faced health risks for modest wages. As Federal Reserve policies protected financial markets and housing values soared, Americans without assets fell further behind. The inflation spike that followed, caused by a mix of pandemic disruptions, government spending, and corporate pricing decisions, further strained household budgets already stretched by rising housing, healthcare, and education costs.[9]
The decade’s economic story reveals a profound challenge: maintaining democratic legitimacy requires not just overall growth but prosperity that’s widely shared. When citizens believe the economic system is rigged against them, they become vulnerable to politicians offering simple villains and solutions, whether immigrants, China, billionaires, or the “deep state.” Economic anxiety turns into political volatility that further strains democratic institutions.[10]
America in the world: the reluctant superpower
For seven decades after World War II, American foreign policy followed a relatively stable consensus. Despite disagreements on specific interventions, both major parties broadly supported American leadership of a global order built on free trade, democratic values, and international institutions. This two-party agreement assumed that American prosperity and security depended on actively shaping global rules rather than withdrawing behind borders.
The past decade saw this consensus break down. As Americans grew skeptical of “forever wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan, questioned trade agreements that seemed to accelerate factory closures, and watched China rise without becoming more democratic, the old foreign policy framework lost its appeal for many citizens. America became what scholars call a “reluctant superpower” – still possessing unmatched military and economic power but increasingly uncertain about how and whether to use that power globally.[11]
This reluctance appeared across administrations in ways that went beyond traditional partisan divisions. President Obama, despite conventional internationalist rhetoric, hesitated to intervene decisively in Syria and focused on “nation-building at home.” President Trump explicitly rejected longstanding commitments to NATO, free trade, and international agreements. President Biden, despite promising “America is back,” kept many Trump-era tariffs, continued the Afghanistan withdrawal, and pursued industrial policies explicitly designed to reduce dependence on global supply chains rather than increase it.[12]
Economic weapons
Even as consensus broke down on how America should engage the world, deeper technological and economic changes were transforming international power itself. The “weaponization of economic interdependence” – using financial systems, supply chains, and technological standards as tools of national power – created new ways to compete beyond traditional military confrontation. As scholar Henry Farrell noted, “Networks that were once celebrated as creating prosperity and interdependence became vectors of vulnerability and coercion.”[13]
The Russia-Ukraine war and growing U.S.-China tensions demonstrated this new reality. America deployed unprecedented financial sanctions against Russia, while restricting Chinese access to advanced semiconductor technology. These economic and technological tools proved more immediately consequential than traditional military power. Yet they also accelerated a fragmentation of the global economy into competing blocs with different technologies, payment systems, and supply chains – a development with profound implications for American prosperity and influence.[14]
Meanwhile, borderless challenges – climate change, pandemic prevention, artificial intelligence governance – grew increasingly urgent. These problems require international cooperation at precisely the moment when the framework for such cooperation has weakened. As climate scientist Joseph Romm observed, “We face collective challenges that no nation can solve alone at exactly the time when nationalism and zero-sum thinking have returned to global politics.”[15]
America’s position in this transformed international landscape remains extraordinary. It still possesses unmatched combinations of military power, economic scale, technological innovation, demographic health, and cultural appeal. Yet its ability to coordinate effective responses to global challenges increasingly depends on rebuilding domestic consensus about America’s role in the world – a consensus that remains elusive in our divided age.[16]
The identity revolution
Perhaps the most profound transformation of the past decade happened not in economic policies or global strategies, but in how Americans understand themselves. The United States experienced what can only be described as an identity revolution – a fundamental rethinking of who belongs, who deserves recognition, and whose experiences should shape our collective understanding.
This revolution emerged from long-developing demographic and cultural changes. America became more racially and ethnically diverse, with non-Hispanic whites projected to become a numerical minority around 2045. Previously marginalized groups – including LGBTQ+ Americans, racial minorities, and women – increasingly demanded not just legal equality but cultural recognition and representation in positions of power. Digital networks amplified voices that traditional gatekeepers had previously excluded.[17]
Pushback and conflict
These changes generated powerful pushback. Many Americans, particularly those with strong attachments to traditional religious and cultural frameworks, experienced rapid social changes as threatening rather than liberating. The rise of what scholars call “status anxiety” – fear of losing social standing in a changing society – provided fertile ground for political movements promising to restore a perceived lost order.[18]
The resulting clashes went beyond traditional political categories. They reflected what sociologist Bradley Campbell calls a transition from “dignity culture” (which emphasizes universal rules and individual responsibility) to “victimhood culture” (which focuses on systemic power imbalances and group identities). This transition created fundamental disagreements not just about policy outcomes but about the frameworks for discussing policy in the first place.[19]
Consider how language changed. Terms like “privilege,” “trigger warnings,” “systemic racism,” “cancel culture,” “woke,” and “cultural appropriation” moved from academic obscurity to mainstream conversation. These new terms reflected genuine attempts to address real disadvantages and historical injustices. Yet they also created new hierarchies and exclusions that many Americans found alienating and divisive.[20]
Battlegrounds of identity
Educational institutions became central battlegrounds in these conflicts. From elite universities to local school boards, Americans fought intensely over curricula, admissions policies, free speech boundaries, and teaching approaches. These battles reflected a deeper question: Whose vision of America should be taught to the next generation? As historian Jill Lepore observed, “Nations, like individuals, tell stories in order to understand what they are, where they come from, and what they want to be.”[21]
The Supreme Court’s role in these identity conflicts proved particularly consequential. Its Obergefell decision legalizing same-sex marriage in 2015 represented a dramatic expansion of recognition for LGBTQ+ Americans. Yet its Dobbs decision overturning Roe v. Wade in 2022 rejected a different liberty claim that many women considered fundamental. These contrasting rulings illustrated how identity questions increasingly dominated America’s highest legal forum – with the Court itself becoming more polarized along partisan lines.[22]
Perhaps most significantly, technology companies became de facto regulators of speech and identity expression. Platforms like Facebook, Twitter, TikTok, and YouTube created unprecedented opportunities for previously marginalized voices while simultaneously developing content moderation systems that shaped acceptable discourse. The power of these private companies to define acceptable expression – with minimal democratic oversight or transparency – represented a profound shift in how societies negotiate identity conflicts.[23]
The identity revolution of the past decade ultimately concerns what philosopher Charles Taylor calls “the politics of recognition” – the human need to have one’s existence and dignity acknowledged by others. In a diverse democracy, this recognition necessarily involves compromise and mutual accommodation. The question for America’s future is whether citizens can develop frameworks that acknowledge both historical injustices and shared humanity – frameworks that allow different identity groups to see themselves as part of a common, if imperfect, project.[24]
The technology acceleration
Humans evolved in small hunter-gatherer bands over hundreds of thousands of years, developing brains and social institutions adapted for that environment. Yet in just the past decade, we’ve created and deployed technologies that fundamentally transform how we communicate, work, learn, and govern ourselves – with minimal collective discussion about their implications.
Consider the smartphone-social media complex that now dominates our attention. In 2010, approximately 35% of American adults owned smartphones. By 2023, that figure approached 85%, with the average user checking their device 96 times daily – approximately once every 10 minutes of waking life. This represents not just more technology use but a qualitative transformation in how humans experience reality.[25]
Fragmenting reality
The social and political consequences have been profound. Information environments that once shared common facts, if not interpretations, fragmented into algorithmically defined bubbles that maximize engagement through emotional triggers – particularly outrage, fear, and tribal loyalty. As former Facebook executive Chamath Palihapitiya confessed, “The short-term, dopamine-driven feedback loops that we have created are destroying how society works…No civil discourse, no cooperation, misinformation, mistrust.”[26]
The rise of Artificial Intelligence
Meanwhile, artificial intelligence (AI) accelerated dramatically. The emergence of large language models like GPT-4 in 2023 demonstrated capabilities that would have seemed like science fiction just five years earlier. These systems now generate human-quality text, code, images, and soon video – with profound implications for job markets, creative industries, information environments, and governance systems.[27]
The economic impacts of these technologies created both extraordinary wealth and disruptive change. America’s five largest companies by market capitalization transformed from a diverse group including oil companies and manufacturers to a tech-dominated group controlling digital platforms and AI capabilities. This concentration reflected not just innovative products but the emergence of what economists call “superstar firms” benefiting from network effects, data advantages, and winner-take-most markets.[28]
Mixed impacts for workers
For workers, technological acceleration brought mixed consequences. Digital platforms created flexible opportunities through the gig economy but also eliminated traditional employment protections. Remote work provided new freedom for knowledge workers while accelerating automation risks for many middle-skill occupations. AI systems promised to augment human capabilities while simultaneously demonstrating potential to replace functions previously considered uniquely human.[29]
Perhaps most significantly, technological acceleration outpaced governance capacity. Regulators designed for industrial-era challenges struggled to address digital harms ranging from privacy violations to algorithmic discrimination. Legislative bodies conducted theatrical hearings with tech executives without developing substantive regulatory frameworks. International coordination remained minimal despite the borderless nature of digital platforms and AI development.[30]
The result was what technology scholar Shoshana Zuboff terms “surveillance capitalism” – an economic system where human experience becomes raw material for commercial prediction products. This system developed not through democratic deliberation but through the unilateral decisions of private companies pursuing growth and profit. The question for America’s future is whether democratic institutions can develop effective governance mechanisms for technologies that increasingly shape every aspect of social, economic, and political life.[31]
The climate reality
For decades, climate change remained primarily theoretical for most Americans – a distant threat discussed by scientists but disconnected from everyday experience. The past decade transformed this perception. Climate change became viscerally real through disasters that impacted communities across political and geographic divides.

Americans experienced unprecedented wildfires in California and Oregon that turned skies apocalyptically orange. They watched Hurricane Harvey dump more than 60 inches of rain on Houston, and Hurricane Maria devastate Puerto Rico. They saw “once-in-century” flooding occur repeatedly in Midwestern states, heat domes push temperatures to lethal levels in the Pacific Northwest, and persistent drought threaten water supplies across the Southwest.[32]
These local experiences reflected global patterns. The decade included the eight hottest years in recorded history. Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations surpassed 420 parts per million – a level not seen in human history and likely not for millions of years prior. Arctic sea ice reached record lows, while ocean heat content reached record highs. These weren’t speculative model projections but measured reality.[33]
Economic impacts
The economic consequences became increasingly apparent. Insurance companies retreated from climate-vulnerable regions, making housing unaffordable or uninsurable for many Americans. Agricultural productivity suffered from changing precipitation patterns and extreme temperatures. Supply chains designed for climate stability faced repeated disruptions from weather extremes. The federal government spent over $300 billion on disaster recovery in the decade – resources unavailable for other priorities.[34]
Political whiplash
Yet America’s political response remained strikingly inconsistent. The Obama administration’s climate initiatives faced judicial challenges and subsequent reversal under President Trump, who withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement and rolled back numerous environmental regulations. The Biden administration then rejoined Paris and passed the Inflation Reduction Act – the largest climate investment in American history – while still approving significant fossil fuel development.[35]
This policy whiplash reflected deeper polarization around climate responses. The issue transformed from a scientific question into an identity marker, with positions determined less by technical assessment than by political and cultural affiliations. As environmental scholar Andrew Hoffman noted, “Climate change became a referendum on different conceptions of the good society rather than a practical problem requiring practical solutions.”[36]
Market-driven change
Meanwhile, market forces drove significant changes despite policy uncertainty. Renewable energy costs declined dramatically, with solar photovoltaic prices falling approximately 85% over the decade and wind power becoming cheaper than coal or natural gas in many regions. Electric vehicles moved from niche products to mainstream offerings, with major manufacturers announcing phase-outs of internal combustion engines. Financial institutions increasingly incorporated climate risks into lending and investment decisions.[37]
These market shifts accelerated a profound economic transformation. Traditional energy companies, once dominant in stock market indexes, lost substantial value relative to technology firms with smaller carbon footprints. Regions dependent on fossil fuel extraction faced challenging transitions, while areas positioned for renewable energy or climate adaptation saw new investment. The spatial distribution of economic opportunity shifted alongside changing climate patterns.[38]
The most profound implication of America’s climate decade may be philosophical. Modern civilization developed during an unusually stable climate period that human activities have now disrupted. This reality challenges assumptions about humanity’s relationship with natural systems and raises questions about responsibility to future generations. As philosopher Dale Jamieson argues, “Climate change forces us to confront limitations in our ethical frameworks that were developed for a world of more proximate causes and effects.”[39]
The next decade: possible futures
What might the next decade hold for American politics, economics, and global position? While prediction is always risky, we can identify key variables that will shape possible futures:
Key variables
Technology governance: First, our ability to govern technology will significantly influence outcomes. If democratic institutions develop effective frameworks for managing AI development, digital platform regulation, and biotechnology, these technologies could enhance rather than undermine democratic functioning. If governance capacity remains limited, technological development will continue to outpace democratic oversight with increasingly destabilizing consequences.[40]
Economic distribution: Second, economic distribution patterns will determine political stability. If productivity growth from technological innovation translates to broadly shared prosperity, political extremism will likely moderate. If growth continues to concentrate among already advantaged groups while costs like housing, healthcare, and education remain unaffordable for many Americans, political volatility will intensify regardless of which party holds power.[41]
Climate adaptation: Third, climate adaptation capacity will increasingly determine national resilience. Communities that develop infrastructure, insurance mechanisms, and governance systems adapted to climate instability will thrive relative to those that remain designed for conditions that no longer exist. America’s federal structure creates space for experimentation, but also risks growing disparities between proactive and reactive regions.[42]
Demographic evolution: Fourth, America’s demographic evolution will continue transforming political coalitions. The increasing diversity of younger generations, combined with the aging of the white population, guarantees ongoing identity negotiation. Whether this produces a more inclusive pluralism or intensified conflict depends substantially on leadership choices and institutional responses.[43]
Geopolitical developments: Finally, geopolitical developments – particularly U.S.-China relations and the evolution of technological spheres of influence – will shape America’s global position. The emerging era features not ideological competition like the Cold War but rather “systems competition” between different models of social organization, economic development, and technological governance.[44]
Three possible scenarios
These variables suggest three plausible scenarios for America’s next decade:
Muddling through: In a “muddling through” scenario, institutional resilience prevents worst-case outcomes despite ongoing polarization and governance challenges. Electoral processes maintain legitimacy despite heated rhetoric, technological development proceeds with minimal but increasing regulation, and climate adaptation advances unevenly across regions. America maintains global leadership in key domains while accommodating China’s rise in others, producing a messy but functional equilibrium.[45]
Renewal: In a “renewal” scenario, current challenges catalyze institutional innovation and democratic revitalization. New governance frameworks emerge for technological regulation, economic reforms reduce inequality while maintaining dynamism, and climate response creates widely shared economic opportunities. America develops a foreign policy that balances competition with China in strategic domains while cooperating on shared challenges like pandemic prevention and AI safety.[46]
Fragmentation: In a “fragmentation” scenario, polarization intensifies to the point of democratic dysfunction. Electoral processes face recurring legitimacy crises, technological development proceeds with minimal accountability, and climate impacts overwhelm adaptation capacity in vulnerable regions. Internationally, America’s internal divisions undermine its ability to maintain credible commitments or shape global standards, accelerating the fragmentation of the international system into competing blocs.[47]
Which scenario emerges depends less on which party wins specific elections than on deeper institutional adaptations. As historian Jill Lepore observes, “American history is a series of adaptations to changing conditions – some successful, others catastrophic. The question is not whether adaptation will occur, but whether it happens through deliberation or crisis.”[48]
Finding agency in turbulent times
The past decade’s transformations might suggest individuals have little power against such powerful forces. Yet history shows otherwise. At previous junctures when technological change, economic dislocation, and political polarization threatened democratic functioning, Americans developed institutional innovations that channeled these forces toward constructive rather than destructive outcomes.
Learning from history
During the Progressive Era, as industrialization and immigration transformed American society, reformers created new governance mechanisms – from civil service systems to regulatory agencies – that tamed industrial capitalism’s excesses while maintaining its dynamism. During the New Deal, as economic collapse threatened democratic legitimacy, innovators developed social insurance programs and financial regulations that stabilized the system while preserving market mechanisms. During the Cold War, as nuclear technology created existential risks, leaders established arms control frameworks and communication channels that prevented catastrophe.[49]
Today’s challenges require similar institutional creativity. We need governance frameworks for technologies that increasingly determine what information we see, what opportunities we access, and what futures become possible. We need economic arrangements that harness innovation while ensuring broadly shared prosperity. We need democratic processes resilient to polarization and disinformation. We need international institutions capable of addressing borderless challenges from pandemic prevention to AI safety.[50]
The American tradition of adaptation
The American story has never been one of uninterrupted progress. It includes profound failures, particularly regarding racial justice, alongside remarkable achievements. What distinguishes successful periods from failed ones is not the absence of challenges but the capacity to adapt institutions to changing conditions while maintaining core democratic commitments.[51]
As we navigate the coming decade, perhaps the most important insight is that fatalism is unwarranted. The technological transformations reshaping our world still ultimately depend on human choices. The economic arrangements determining prosperity distribution reflect policy decisions, not immutable laws. The democratic institutions governing collective life can be reformed when they prove inadequate.[52]
In his famous letter to William Smith, Thomas Jefferson wrote that “the earth belongs to the living.” He meant that each generation must adapt institutions to its own needs rather than being governed by the dead hand of the past. This insight remains vital. The question is not whether America’s arrangements will change in response to technological acceleration, climate instability, and global realignment – they certainly will. The question is whether we approach that adaptation with wisdom, inclusivity, and foresight, or allow changes to emerge haphazardly from crisis and conflict.[53]
America’s next chapter ultimately depends on recovering what historian Timothy Snyder calls “politics as a matter of agency” – the recognition that collective action can shape systems that otherwise appear beyond our control. If the past decade demonstrated the power of technological, economic, and climatic forces to transform society, perhaps the next will reveal our capacity to channel those forces toward human flourishing.[54]
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